AccuPoll

The AccuPoll voting system was re-examined in Austin on June 9, 2005. The release number for the entire system is 2.5. It is made up of the following sub-systems:

AVS - AccuPoll Voting Stattion - a DRE voting machine

VAW - Voting Administrative Workstation

CVC - Central Vote Consolidator

CCS - Central Count Server

BallotBuilder – used to created the ballot definition

BallotBuilder is a new sub-system that allows a jurisdiction to create the ballot definition. Previously, this function had to performed by the vendor. The program is written in Java and runs on a PC. A log is created which records who created and/or modified the election setup. The program was easy to use and worked without error.

Accupoll has addressed the issues noted in my report from the January 2005 examination:

- The CVC now writes only one message on the real-time log when duplicate ballots are read from a results CD.
- A "Precincts NOT Counted" report is now included.

Findings

- The system still does not have the capability to handle the carly-voting requirements for a jurisdiction. The vendor stated that it would be part of the next release, expected to be presented in August of this year.
- A unique "election signature" is generated each time an election definition image is created. The signature is printed at the bottom of every report which can be used to verify that the correct election is used. The precinct judge should verify that the signature is correct when he opens the polls and runs the "zeros" report. The CCS will not accept a results CD if the signature is incorrect.
- Central-count accumulation continued when the real-time audit-log printer was put in pause mode. The messages were buffered and printed after the printer was put back online. When the printer's power or data cable were disconnected, the program suspended as required. This is acceptable behavior.

Recommedations

- There should be a place on the "zeros" report for the election judge to "sign-off" that the election signature has been verified.
- Every message on the real-time audit-log should indicate the precinct and/or the "results CD" identification number that it pertains to. Because central-count operations can be performed in parallel, messages for a specific precinct or "results CD" can be difficult to track. The number would be helpful for an election audit.

Conclusion

The system is easy to use and it worked without error. It has many safeguards to prevent deliberate or accidental manipulation of the ballot setup and results.

I recommend the system be certified.

Tom Watson Examiner